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These are the rights which make the essence of sovereignty:  ... The power to protect his 
subjects… [the power] of execution of the laws ... the power of raising money. 
 
      Thomas Hobbes, The Leviathan (1615) 
 
  
1.     INTRODUCTION 
 
Raising revenue is the most basic task of the state.  Before a state can protect its citizens, before 
it can provide justice or administer a bureaucracy, it needs to raise money. Through its key role 
as the tie that binds the ruler and the ruled, taxation supports representation, accountability, and 
state capacity.  Yet taxation and revenue are rarely mentioned as democracy and governance 
issues in developing countries.2  A concern with taxation should be at the core of development 
efforts, yet it is not.3   
 
This article focuses on revenue, state capacity, and governance.  It offers an appreciation of the 
potency of revenue as a development issue, and one that should not be left to economists.   
Taxation is usually a government’s major source of revenue, but revenue raising in most 
developing countries is broader than taxation alone.  Public enterprises and royalties on natural 
resources frequently play a role.  Foreign aid is a -- sometimes the -- major source of revenue in 
many low-income countries, and this has made state-building a different matter over the past half 
century than ever before in history.   
 
Above all, taxation and revenue are issues of national power (Lamborn, 1983: 126).  Mobilising 
resources is not simply a technical exercise, but involves overcoming domestic and sometimes 
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international political opposition.  Countries trying to improve their extractive capacity in the era 
of foreign aid also face a circumscribed set of “acceptable” policies that narrow their options.    
 
The article begins with a brief review of revenue raising, representation, and state capacity in 
historical perspective.  It then considers three political issues associated with taxation and 
revenue-raising: state capacity; aid dependence; and participatory budgeting. Throughout, I draw 
on the example of Mauritius, a small but successful Leviathan, to illustrate some of the political 
and institutional dynamics of revenue raising, but also to challenge some of the conventional 
wisdom on revenue policy and foreign aid. 
 
2. REVENUE, REPRESENTATION, AND STATE CAPACITY: SOME HISTORY 
 
It is often argued that in Europe, war was the primary cause of the growth of the modern nation-
state.  Hobbes foreshadowed this analysis in The Leviathan, when enumerating the rights and 
responsibilities of the sovereign: ‘Ninthly, is annexed to the sovereignty the right of making war 
and peace with other nations and Commonwealths; that is to say, of judging when it is for the 
public good, and how great forces are to be assembled, armed, and paid for that end, and to levy 
money upon the subjects to defray the expenses thereof.’  The need for revenues stimulated more 
efficient bureaucracies in some cases; in others, greater representation in governance. War and 
taxation are thus intimately linked in interpretations of European history.  The sovereign levied 
money upon his or her subjects (generally, economic barons who passed much of the burden 
down through the feudal system) to pay for wars and imperialist expansion.   
 
In England, those barons demanded a greater say in the running of the country and better 
protection of their property rights; by 1688, they had both. ‘The key to the story,’ noted North 
and Thomas (1973: 149) in their interpretative economic history, ‘was the inability of the Crown 
successfully to enlarge fiscal revenues’.  Less than a hundred years later, the American colonies 
went to war with England over, inter alia, taxation without representation.  For those raised in 
the Anglo-American tradition, the link between taxation and representation became a 
fundamental tenet of political development. Yet several things need to be noted about this 
interpretation.  First, that link operated between economic elites and the sovereign.  It was not 
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primarily a case of peasants and ordinary citizens demanding a greater say in the disposition of 
their money.  If economic elites are largely outside the fiscal net, as they are in many developing 
countries, taxation may not stimulate effective demands for power sharing from authoritarian 
rulers.  Taxation has to bite directly to stimulate calls for political change.  Second, the need for 
revenues also stimulated institutional changes that provided a more secure and efficient 
foundation for taxation.  This second point is often taken for granted, but it may in fact be as 
critical for development as the possible link with representation. 
 
State Capacity and Taxation in Early Modern History 
 
In Europe, nation-building in an environment of intense military competition, and later, the 
global competition of imperialism, created the rising demand for revenue.  In China during the 
same era, a decentralised but coherent and vast bureaucracy, employing magistrates selected in 
highly competitive national exams dating back to the Sui Dynasty (581-618 AD), efficiently 
collected annual land taxes from China’s 90 million acres.4  China’s long history of bureaucratic 
tax administration shows that efficient taxation existed before the rise of the nation-state, and 
that the stimulus of war is neither necessary, nor (quite probably) sufficient, for the development 
of bureaucratic capacity.  
 
In fact, the more important lesson from the European experience may be the link between 
revenue-raising concerns and demands for institutional change.  In England, more secure private 
property rights and a revenue bureaucracy were the result.  In Spain, which had early access to 
gold, silver and other plunder from its conquest of much of the New World, incentives to 
develop an efficient system of property rights, domestic tax bureaucracy, or to stimulate more 
efficient domestic production were absent.  Furthermore, to offset the instability of their external 
sources of revenue, Spain’s monarchs borrowed from the new capital markets.5  In 1562, interest 
costs on these loans drained more than 25 percent of the annual budget, and Spanish rulers 
declared bankruptcy six times between 1557 and 1647 (North and Thomas, 1973: 129).  
Economic stagnation in Spain lasted for several centuries while England revolutionised first 
agriculture, and then industry.  North and Thomas blame that stagnation in large part on the 
sources of Spanish revenues.  A cycle of foreign loans and repeated bankruptcy; foreign plunder; 
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and domestic reliance on revenues from sheep herding failed to stimulate secure property rights 
or a more efficient economy.   
 
Of Colonial Rule and Revenue 
 
Colonial rulers used a wide variety of instruments to raise revenue.  Sometimes they dispensed 
with the taxation link and used forced labour (corvée) to create local infrastructure directly.  In 
Sierra Leone and other colonies, the British imposed “hut taxes” to pay for the costs of 
controlling the hinterland.  Hut taxes were more efficient than land taxes in a region where land 
was held communally and property rights over it could take many forms.  Later in the colonial 
period, they established marketing boards to tax exports through control of prices paid to 
farmers. The colonial powers saw taxation as a powerful tool for forcing rural populations into 
the market economy and creating a near compulsion for subsistence farmers to labour seasonally 
on the commercial plantations established by Europeans.     
 
Some colonial governments took over the revenue raising systems put in place by earlier rulers.  
In Southeast Asia, they used the same tax farming institutions established by Malay princes in 
the pre-colonial era. Tax farms gave local merchants (frequently, the Chinese, who were 
conveniently alien) a monopoly on the sale of certain items – salt was a popular choice.  The 
merchant was required to turn over a certain amount of revenue.  Surpluses above that amount 
could be accumulated.  Many of Southeast Asia’s wealthy Chinese capitalists gained their start 
as tax farmers (Brown, 1994).  In Africa, tax farming was also practised, but generally through 
delegating tax collection to local “chiefs” who were frequently promoted into positions and 
given authority they would never have had under traditional rule.6   
 
Other colonies raised revenues by issuing securities in international capital markets.  The 
legislative debates in Mauritius are illuminating in this regard.  In 1901, during a debate over the 
degree to which the local Council of Government (the legislative council) had the right to 
propose the repeal or reduction of certain taxes in the colony, the Surveyor General pointed out 
that the securities issued by Mauritius were “at the top of the list.  Our 4 per cent. inscribed stock 
is worth £ 113, while that of Canada, which is surely a richer country than Mauritius, is only 
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worth £ 105.”  The Surveyor General went on to explain that the higher value was due to the 
guarantee of the Imperial Government standing behind the securities, but one of the council 
members objected and pressed the issue:   
 
“We all admit that in the last resort the Imperial Government is responsible; and of 
course if the Imperial Government is responsible it should have a control; but not to the 
extent that is claimed now.  The control which is claimed now is nothing more or less 
than this: We shall do what we please but you will not have the right of expressing your 
views, except when we come to you for a vote.  That is all.  But you curtail our rights!  
We had the right before – it is not denied – of expressing our views upon the existing 
taxation.  That is denied to us now.  We cannot open our mouths – certainly that is 
curtailing our rights. 
 
When the Governor pointed to a circular from London suggesting that the change in the 
prerogatives of Crown Colonies in general had resulted from problems in the West Indies that 
had required financial assistance from the Imperial Government, the member exclaimed:   
 
It may be right as far as the West Indian Islands are concerned, but what financial 
assistance has been given to the Colony of Mauritius?  I fail to see.  If I understand aright 
the meaning of this sentence there have been grants, there have been doles given to the 
West Indian colonies, but here nothing of the kind.  ‘Financial assistance’ means what? It 
means money actually given by the Imperial Government, but the Imperial Government 
has done nothing of the kind for Mauritius.  . .  When a debtor does not fulfill his 
engagements towards his creditors the creditors have a right to step in and to see more 
clearly into the administration of the affairs in which they have invested money.  But this 
has never been the case of Mauritius. . .  Make any comments you like upon Mauritius, 
but do not say that Mauritius in some respect is similarly situated as the West Indian 
Islands.  We are not in their position. We have always met our engagements, we have 
always striven to pay our creditors – and that is why we have such a good name in 
England and why our debentures are worth 13 per cent. premium.7  
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This passage highlights three things about revenue raising in the colonial period.  First, it is clear 
that as early as 1901, some colonies were expected to raise some of their operating budget in the 
London capital markets through the sale of securities and debentures, although with the backing 
of the colonial power. At least in the case of Mauritius, this created a track record and a 
reputation in the international market, while at the same time fostering a sense of self-reliance 
and pride in being credit-worthy.  Second, although the drain of resources was normally from the 
colony to the colonial power, this was not always the case.  Financial aid – “there have been 
grants, there have been doles” – was sometimes given out to the colonies, suggesting that even in 
an earlier period, some administrations were not able to raise enough revenue to pay for the very 
limited governance imposed under colonial rule.  Related, they then had to suffer greater controls 
over their affairs.  But if a colony was able to manage its finances well, it had earned a voice in 
tax policy, or so the Mauritians argued.  Third, at least in the case of Mauritius, at a very early 
period representation, revenue, and accountability were intertwined.  The local council, 
comprised partly of elected members, expected to be able to influence local tax policy, in part 
because it had built a credible commitment to fiscal responsibility – symbolised by the premium 
on their international bonds.  
 
The End of Colonialism and the End of Local Taxes? 
 
As colonialism ended, some newly independent governments dismantled the colonial local 
taxation systems (Guyer, 1992: 43).  In many of the weaker post-colonial countries, nationalist 
leaders relied on revenues paid directly by enclave mining interests, avoiding the need to foster 
the development of a local business class that was seen as either being too closely linked to the 
former colonial power (a “pariah” business class) or as a potential challenge to government 
authority and control.8  For several decades many countries maintained the marketing boards that 
had been established in the later years of colonialism, and the gap between higher world prices 
and the low prices paid to African farmers became an important of revenue.  Taxation on civil 
service salaries (that were easily “captured”) was also significant.  But aside from the civil 
service and farmers producing for export, as Guyer noted, “neither the rich nor the poor in much 
of present day Africa (or more particularly Nigeria) are taxed anything remotely close to the 
proportions of their income and wealth that their counterparts in peasant and capitalist history 
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have often been forced to pay”(45).9  To the extent this was true, it underscores not only the 
missing link between taxation and representation (Guyer’s point) but the untapped potential for 
greater self-reliance in some of the newly independent (and soon to be aid dependent) nations. 
 
 
3.  REVENUE, TAXATION, AND DEVELOPMENT 
 
In 1963, as one country after another emerged from colonial rule, economist Nicholas Kaldor 
wrote an article for the journal Foreign Affairs with a title that reflected that untapped potential:  
“Will Underdeveloped Countries Learn to Tax?”  (Kaldor, 1963). He laid out a number of issues 
that remain highly salient.  He warned about the dangers of aid dependence, urged countries to 
consider a variety of revenue sources (for example, taxes on land as well as income), and pointed 
out that revenue shortfalls in some developing countries – Latin America in particular -- were 
probably due to a failure to tax the wealthy effectively.   
 
As Kaldor suspected, many underdeveloped countries did have trouble learning to tax.  Political 
control by economic elites explained some of the problem.  Some governments may have seen 
other sources of revenue, including foreign aid, as involving less effort than taxation.  In 
addition, learning to tax in the age of the Washington Consensus meant that countries now have 
fewer choices of instruments.  The recipe for taxation is the same, no matter what a country’s 
stage of development: recommended low tariffs mean that indirect taxation has to shift to value-
added taxes.  Income and corporate tax rates are to be low and the taxes broad-based.  Taxes on 
land are not part of the Consensus, although, as Kaldor remarked (1963: 413), “the taxation of 
land can be a very potent engine of economic development.”  In their formative periods, Asia 
and Europe both relied heavily on the land tax. Yet today land taxes are widely seen as 
“politically impossible” (Guyer 1992) removing what might have been a progressive and 
effective revenue source.   
 
 
Taxation and State Capacity 
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Studies of governance repeatedly point to revenue raising as the foundation of state capacity. 
Kaldor’s 1963 analysis threw a spotlight on the link between state capacity and taxation:  “No 
underdeveloped country has the manpower resources or the money to create a high-grade civil 
service overnight.  But it is not sufficiently recognized that the revenue service is the ‘point of 
entry’; if they concentrated on this, they would secure the means for the rest (417; emphasis 
added).”   
 
Some countries did see the link quite clearly.  Thailand, which was never colonised but faced the 
threat of both French and British expansionism, reacted in the late 19th century by reorganising 
its tax system.  The first reforms took place in 1873, establishing a central budget system.  In 
1890, King Rama V invited fiscal advisers from England to oversee the country’s revenue and 
expenditure accounts (Akira 1989: 79).  These early moves helped undergird the relatively high 
level of capacity in Thailand’s economic ministries.  Efforts to increase capacity were initiated 
by Thai rulers, who had diagnosed their own problems and sought the solution from available 
international experts.  
 
In the early years of development assistance, economists assumed that countries would need time 
and assistance to increase their tax revenues.  Nobel laureate Sir W. Arthur Lewis pointed out in 
the 1960s that: 
 
However sharply one may reform the fiscal structure, it is not politically feasible to 
increase sharply the share of taxation in the national income over a period of time.   
Except in wartime, attempts to do this have always ended in strikes and riots, even in 
one-party states.  Only a police state can take an extra one percent of national income 
every year.  If one wishes to raise the tax rate from fifteen to twenty per cent, this is 
normally something to do gradually over ten to fifteen years.  Indeed this is the crux of 
the argument for foreign aid.  Any country can afford to tax itself twenty per cent and 
save eight per cent, but if it is to get there from a much lower level one must give it time 
(1969: 52; emphasis added). 
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Have developing countries increased their tax rates?  A quick look at the data (Table 1, based on 
World Bank data that is unfortunately quite incomplete) suggests that middle-income countries 
have indeed followed Lewis’s advice about gradually increasing their tax revenues.  Over two 
decades, middle-income countries have increased the percentage of GDP from tax revenue by 4 
to 5 points.  For low-income countries, however, tax revenue as a percentage of GDP has 
declined by almost 3 points on average. 
 
Generalised poverty and continued low prices for commodity exports explain some of this 
decline, but the degree to which revenues have failed to increase in the poorest countries is still 
striking.  As Lewis argued (above), the argument for foreign aid rested in part on the expectation 
that countries would use it to expand savings and investment (including in human capital) while 
slowly increasing their ability to sustain the extra expenditure themselves.  Middle-income 
countries, on average, have been able to do this, but the poorer countries have not.  The failure of 
revenue raising seems to be most acute in countries that receive large amounts of aid.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1:  Tax Revenue as Percentage of Gross 
Domestic Product, Averages 
 Average, 1972-
1976 
Average, 1995-
1999 
Low income 
countries 
 
17.0 
 
14.3 
Lower-middle   
 10
income 
countries 
14.9 19.0 
Upper-middle 
income 
countries 
 
18.2 
 
23.3 
Data Source: World Bank World Development 
Indicators, 2001.  Tax revenue includes taxes on trade, 
income, goods and services, profits and capital gains.  
Only central government tax revenue is included.  
 
 
 
Aid Dependence and Taxation 
 
Poverty, a large agricultural sector, and relatively small trade sectors do impede the collection of 
taxes (Ghura, 1998).  But in poor countries that receive large amounts of aid, could it be possible 
that the incentive structure is also at fault?  In June 2001, the Tanzania Parliament passed the 
government’s 2002/02 budget of $US 1.9 billion.  However, projected revenues left a very large 
deficit of $722 million that the government expected would be financed by grants and external 
loans.  This large gap between revenues and expenditures exists despite a high level of concern 
about the issue of aid dependence, expressed both by government and donors (Fjeldstad, 2001).   
 
In surveying the issue, former World Bank chief economist Joseph Stiglitz has argued that “it 
may make sense for the government to treat foreign aid as a legitimate source of revenue, just 
like taxes, and balance the budget inclusive of foreign aid” (1998: 10).  But foreign aid is not just 
like taxes.  Aside from the fact that some aid comes as a loan and must be repaid (unlike taxes), 
there are three other important differences.  First, large amounts of aid can undermine 
responsiveness of government to taxpayers, establishing relations of accountability between 
donors and governments, not between governments and citizens.10  Only when aid comes as a 
loan, and citizens understand that it must be repaid through their taxes, are the latter 
accountability links fostered.  Second, aid may affect the legitimacy of the state and this could 
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affect tax revenues, in a vicious circle.  When citizens identify donors as responsible for 
improved roads or health clinics, they may be less likely to hold up their end of the citizen-
government bargain by paying their assessed taxes.  Third, aid does not require governments to 
develop capacity.  In fact, the system of aid thrives on governments that lack capacity, while 
creating incentives both for donor agency employees and host country employees to resist 
effective capacity-building.11  Taxation does require capacity, and as countries move down the 
scale from simple trade taxes to consumption and income taxes, the demands on capacity rise.  
This creates an effective stimulus, that donors’ conditionality simply has not been able to 
provide. 
 
It is not easy to break the incentives set up through the aid system.  Zambia, one of Africa’s most 
aid dependent countries, agreed to a cash budget in 1993 in an attempt to establish fiscal 
discipline (Bolnick, 1997).  A long history of borrowing in order to finance expenditures led 
Zambia to a per capita external debt that was one of the highest in the world.  Inflation had 
reached 191 percent in 1992.  Bolnick notes that as the cash budget was being discussed, “the 
stakes were high because credibility was a key to reviving the economy and sustaining donor 
support (306; emphasis added).”  Yet though donors were the primary audience for the cash 
budget, one of the side effects of the cash budget was to “spark active concern with tax revenues.  
. …  Suddenly, the attitudes toward tax administration took an abrupt turn. . …  Creation of a 
new revenue authority to professionalize tax administration became a clarion call for the 1994 
budget (318).”  The cash budget stopped Zambians from pushing the costs of current spending 
onto future generations (through borrowing) and only then did the need to boost state capacity 
become quite clear.12  
 
The case of Zambia presents a particularly clear example of way the relationship between tax 
effort, state capacity, and aid dependence can work in some cases.  In Sub-Saharan Africa, the 
data suggests a mild, but negative, correlation between levels of tax effort, and levels of aid.  
Chart 1 graphs aid levels averaged over the 1990-1995 period, with tax effort indices averaged 
over the same period (Stotsky and WoldeMariam, 1997).13  The slope is gently negative, 
suggesting that aid might in fact be associated with lower tax effort.  Further research, 
controlling for other factors, would be necessary to test this hypothesis.  Higher levels of aid can 
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in fact usefully substitute for tax effort for low-income countries.  The challenge is: how to 
prevent aid from muffling the “clarion call” to gradually build – not weaken –  an aid dependent 
state’s own extractive capacity?   
 
Chart 1: Aid and Tax Effort 
in Sub-Saharan Africa
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In fact, aid can be delivered in ways that support local ownership and at the same time reward 
productive effort.  The European Union established one mechanism, through the Lomé 
Convention’s special preferences for products produced in developing countries.  These 
preferences have been rightly criticised for keeping countries locked into a pattern of raw 
material production.  Yet Mauritius has benefited enormously from the Sugar Protocol 
preferences, which channels an estimated 3 to 7 percent of GDP to the country through the 
higher than market sugar prices.  This source of foreign aid is largely ignored in studies of aid, 
but for countries like Mauritius, which invested in supporting the development of the privately-
owned industry while also levying a progressive tax on medium and large sugar producers in 
order to recoup some of this benefit, aid revenues through Sugar Protocol sales were “earned” 
income.  With incentives from the government, the private sector in Mauritius channelled their 
sugar ‘rents’ into local export processing industries and tourism services.  As Moore (1998 and 
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2001) has pointed out, earned revenues are more likely to build accountability and foster a 
developmental state than revenues through natural resource mining or aid.  They may also do 
more to promote the private sector, if accompanied by the right incentive framework. 
Developing countries need to produce in order to procure the special preferences in the European 
market.  This way of delivering aid resembles the “earned income tax credit” often touted in the 
United States as a way to boost incomes of the working poor.  Unfortunately, the rise of WTO 
rules and the demise of special trading relationships mean that this source of “earned aid” is in 
the process of being eliminated.   
 
 
Participatory Budgeting and Better Governance 
 
Although the terms “taxation” and “revenue generation” are rarely heard in conjunction with 
democracy and governance in developing countries, budgeting issues are deeply political, and 
more participation in budget development may be an important mechanism for strengthening 
democracy and building a sense of accountability.  It may also heighten understanding of the 
trade-offs in spending and revenue generation, possibly bolstering resistance to the risks of 
populist spending.  In most of low-income Africa, citizens have little idea of the 
revenue/expenditure process.  In Kenya before 1999, the budget process “was shrouded in 
mystery,” as Achim Chiaji (2001) explains: 
 
Technocrats at the Treasury monopolised the entire process of formulation and 
implementation of Kenya's Budget with disastrous consequences. The budget is not 
sufficiently debated before presentation and non-state participation results in too many 
donor-generated proposals. There has been considerable concern following revelations 
that the donor organisations led by the IMF are playing a major role in determining the 
2001/2002 Budget proposals. Another weakness is that budget debate is neither 
integrated nor systematic hence it is often inexhaustive. Parliamentarians see the 
proposals for the first time when the Minister for Finance presents it for debate in 
parliament. The period allowed for debate is also too short considering the fact that the 
report is usually broad and over 400 pages. Furthermore, the budget is crafted in a 
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technical language that makes it difficult for ordinary wananchi to interpret its real 
implications. 
 
Contrast this with Mauritius.  In the late 1970s, Mauritius lurched through a series of economic 
crises that were only ended when the country managed to devalue the rupee (twice), cut 
spending, and attract investment into the export-processing zone.  As part of the political 
handling of the crisis, the government began to consult more openly with the main “social 
partners” on economic and social policy, and, in particular, on the budget.  Over the past two 
decades, those consultations have become deeply institutionalised.  Each year in the spring, the 
Minister of Finance makes the rounds of the country’s major stakeholders, listening to their 
views, exchanging comments, accepting their written analyses.  Each evening, the television 
news is full of brief reports of these consultations: union members meet the Minister one day; 
business associations another; and the major social welfare NGOs and other associations also 
have their opportunity.  When the budget is finally presented to Parliament, the details are 
splashed across the major newspapers.  Almost instantly (since 1996/97), the budget speech and 
the entire budget are accessible on the Internet.  All donor funding is channelled through the 
budget, with details linking funding sources to particular development expenditures.  Aid is fully 
transparent, and borrowings are publicised.   
 
Participatory budgeting and a visible link between taxation and spending in Mauritius forced 
groups outside the government to enhance their own capacity, in order to interact with the 
government as credible peers, and gain an audience for their analyses.  It also allows Mauritians 
to challenge their government through their lively press, as happened not long ago with the 
Minister of Education concerning a proposed education project.  An open letter in the country’s 
major newspaper pointed out that the project was flawed, and reminded the Minister:  “If the 
government borrows millions of rupees from the World Bank for your project, it is done in the 
name of All the Mauritian people . . . If it is necessary to repay this debt of millions of rupees for 
a project, it is each one of us . . . who are going to pay by our taxes.”14  The link between 
taxation, revenue, and accountability is quite clear. 
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This link needs to be stronger in many low-income countries.  What is the potential for change?  
In some countries (now including Kenya), the new emphasis of the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund on civil society consultation over Poverty Reduction Strategy 
Papers (PRSPs) has in effect created consultations over the budget.  In Africa, Uganda was the 
first HIPC15 country to try participatory budgeting.  The Ministry of Finance began to consult the 
country’s major social groups in the process of preparing the country’s first Poverty Eradication 
Action Plan (PEAP, which later became the PRSP) in order to qualify for debt relief from the 
World Bank and the IMF.  Also with donor encouragement, Uganda adopted a three-year, 
medium-term budget framework that emphasises civil society involvement. Although making 
budgeting more transparent and participatory holds potential for increasing accountability in 
Uganda, the civil society discussion focuses almost entirely on the expenditure side (“dividing 
the cake”); there is little discussion of the revenue side, except for uses of donor funds.16  Since 
civil society organisations are usually tax-exempt, this means that the political link between 
taxpayers and government spending is still missing.17  The process is also largely donor-driven, 
and it is not clear how deeply it will be institutionalised before the donors step out of the picture.  
Unlike many other donor “fads” however, this process stimulates a felt need for greater capacity 
in many branches of government hitherto outside of the budgeting process, and in civil society.  
It does not require foreign technical assistance, and it emphasises accountability through active 
citizen monitoring.  However, it does depend on a close correlation between the budget and 
actual expenditures, something that has been difficult to achieve in aid dependent countries, 
where, among other problems, the gap between commitments and disbursements can be quite 
large (Brautigam 2000; Burnell 2001).  
 
4.  FINAL THOUGHTS 
 
“The power of raising money” is central to sovereignty, Hobbes argued. It may also be central to 
the process of political development.  Historically, the need to raise revenues led to institutional 
change: more efficient property rights, more effective bureaucracies.  Today, a certain degree of 
extractive capacity may be a prerequisite for state capacity and “ownership” of development 
strategies.   
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Taxation may also stimulate representation and greater accountability - although this is unlikely 
to happen unless political and economic elites themselves feel the bite of tax policy directly.  
The “Boston Tea Party” protest was led by New England merchants whose business interests 
were threatened by changes in tea duties.  The understanding that revenue, representation, and 
accountability are linked was loudly expressed in the Legislative Council in Mauritius more than 
100 years ago, but along with the emphasis on voice, was the expectation that accountability was 
a two-way street.  Responsible fiscal behaviour had earned the Legislative Council the right to 
demand a greater say in tax policy.  Mauritians still make the connection between accountability 
and taxation, demanding that the government spend their tax dollars wisely, even if foreign aid is 
involved.  In many other countries that link between citizens and governments is broken.  Efforts 
to repair it by promoting participatory budgeting may have some impact, particularly if they 
stimulate greater capacity building among non-governmental organisations. Yet unless all donors 
agree to program their aid only through the budget, and step back from dictating budget 
proposals, participatory budgeting will be a hollow exercise.   
     
Learning to tax, as Nicholas Kaldor pointed out, ‘does not depend merely on the individual good 
will of ministers or on the correct intellectual appreciation of the technical problems involved.  
It is predominantly a matter of political power (1963: 418; emphasis added).’  Countries like 
Mauritius learned how to tax long ago and over time, built a ‘virtuous circle’ weaving together 
taxation, capacity, representation, and accountability.  We in the development studies 
community clearly need to pay more attention to the specific ways in which foreign aid can help 
states and societies build these links rather than try, feebly, to substitute for them. 
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NOTES 
                                                 
1 Many thanks to the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars for a resident 
fellowship 2001-2002, during which this article was written.  Research assistants Sylvia Kim, 
and especially Grissel Mercado, have been very helpful in some of the background work for this 
article.  Thanks also to David Kinsella for technical assistance, and to David Hirschmann, Lise 
Rakner, and Mick Moore for careful reads and helpful comments.    
2 For exceptions, see Guyer (1992) and Moore (1998 and 2001). 
3 For example, a recent search of the World Bank’s project database brought up 44 projects 
concerned with “tax” or “taxation”, but 402 related to “trade”. 
http://www.worldbank.org/sprojects (Projects search engine).  Accessed February 26, 2002. 
4 Spence (1974: xvi); Thanks also to Zhou Yongming and Chris Reardon for discussions on 
China’s tax bureaucracy. 
5 Why did England not do this? I don’t know, but it’s an important and interesting question. 
6 It would be interesting to know the extent to which these chiefs were able to accumulate wealth 
through their control over indirect taxation, and whether or not, if they did, they invested in trade 
or production, as did their counterparts in Southeast Asia. 
7 Mauritius Council of Government, 1902: 447-453, passim.   
8Cartwright (1978: 252) cited in Migdal: 266.   
9 Guyer’s research suggested that European peasants in the Middle Ages paid about a third of 
their harvest in taxes (p. 72, n. 9). 
10 See Moore (1998 and 2001) for an excellent expanded treatment of this problem. 
11 For an example of how this works in practice, see Hirschmann (2002). 
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12 Unfortunately, as Rakner et al (2001) have demonstrated, the constraint of the cash budget 
failed to rein in expenditures; it simply meant that suppliers were not paid. 
13 Date on aid comes from the World Bank (2001).  Data on tax effort comes from Stotsky and 
WoldeMariam (1997) who develop their tax effort indices using not the standard measure which 
is simply tax revenue as a percentage of GNP, but a measure that reflects the structure of the 
economy and the possible sources of revenue.  The chart omits the outlier country of São Tomé 
and Principe, which had an average aid dependence of  115.55 percent of GNP, and an aid effort 
of 0.74 (1.00 is average; 0.74 is well below average).  Including São Tomé and Principe makes 
the regression line steeper. 
14 “Lettre Ouverte à M. le Ministre de l’Education et à ses Conseillers,” Le Mauricien (Port 
Louis), 14 April, 1999, p. 11 (my translation). 
15 HIPC is the Highly Indebted Poor Country multilateral debt relief initiative. 
16 For example, the World Bank notes that: “Under the Medium Term Budget Framework, line 
ministries are provided global budgetary ceilings on which to base their sectoral allocations. 
New sectoral working groups comprising the Ministry of Finance, line ministries, and technical 
advisors were established to help develop sectoral priorities within the expenditure limits.  For 
the first time, civil society is involved in the dialogue on priorities and spending commitments.  
To better reflect district poverty priorities and to bring local governments into the medium-term 
expenditure process, local government officials also prepare medium-term expenditure plans.  
This process feeds into the budget framework paper and annual budgets.” World Bank, “Uganda: 
Poverty Reduction Strategy” (no date)  Accessed February 28, 2002. 
http://www.worldbank.org/poverty/strategies/uganda.htm. 
17 Furthermore, of the many documents that exist describing Uganda’s participatory budgeting, 
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few bring in the role of parliament, normally one of the major vehicles through which 
democratic participation happens.   
